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THE ACCRDAL OF GROSS INCOME
BACKWELL, Peter William John
The manner in which income is accrued for the purpose 
of determining taxable income ia Che subject of an o n ­
going controversy. This research report Is aimed at 
highlighting the problems attached to the recognition 
of income for tax purposes.
Various attempts at taking a snapshot of an entity in 
the midst of its earnings cycle have been made. An 
examination of the evolution of those attempts has been 
undertaken with particular focus on the techniques 
adopted in the recognition of income for the purposes 
of determining the liability for income tax.
The report incorporates an examination of the basic 
concepts relating to the recognition of income, the 
method of income accrual followed in certain foreign 
tax Jurisdictions, and the current state of the law in 
South Africa. The recommendations formulated by the 
Margo Commission are analysed, and the shortfalls and 
anomalies in the various interpretations of accrual are 
demonstrated.
The current state of the law, it is submitted, requires 
that, Income be recognised for tax purposes at the time 
when the taxpayer becomes unconditionally entitled to 
the amount in question. Any accrual, including the 
right to claita payment in the future, should be valued 
at the time of accrual, and not at the end of the year 
of assessment, as is suggested by some authors.
The current state of the law is plagued with practical 
difficulties and results in a number of 
inconsistencies. The basic concepts relating to the 
recognition of income that are considered to be 
desirable are not adequately addressed under the 
current position.
The practice of taxing accruals emp". by the revenue
authorities selectively recognises . legal precedent 
and, it is predicted, will have to be amended soon. The 
complexities of the issues involved in the recognition 
of income are such that the matter cannot be dealt with 
adequately without considerable further investigation.
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PREFACE
This research report is concerned with the process of 
accrual. Whether it is income or capital or some other 
thing which accrues is an entirely separate'(and fairly 
well addressed) question.
For nearly three quarters of a century there has been 
doubt regarding the interpretation of the gross income 
definition. At long last a taxpayer has challenged the 
Commissioner's practice in this respect. The matter is 
of great importance to all tax practitioners and 
academics. This research report has been undertaken in 
order to highlight the many problems involved in the 
acrual of Income which has not been received.
No attempt has been made to resolve the problem, as 
research of this nature does not provide an appropriate 
basis for the formulation of suitable solution. It is 
submitted that substantial research is required before
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1. INTRODUCTION
"Tax ought to be certain . This is a very Important 
principle in modern tax law • Adequate tax planning 
would become an Impossibility if the parameters within 
which the fiscus operates were not clearly defined 
The degree of certainty required is achieved by means 
of the formulation of a set of rules which clearly 
indicates the method and manner in which tax is to be 
collected " (Smith , 1776) .
The principle of certainty in tax lav is regarded by 
many authors to be fundamental to any form of tax 
legislation . The "set of rules " referred to by Smith 
is the statute that empowers the revenue authorities to 
extract the tax from the populace . In South Africa the 
Income Tax Act (Act no. 59 of 1962 , as amended) is one 
example of such legislation .
As its name implies , the Income Tax Act (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Act") is the taxing statute that 
applies to income . However , when one considers the 
nature of income , in the sense of the common usage of 
the word (or as viewed by economists or accountant:!) , 
and compares this to the manner in which the Act 
operates , it is abundantly clear that in South Africa 
taxes on income are determined not on income , L>ut on a
purely artificial basis (Broomberg , < 1972i. This
artificial basis of taxation was identified by the 
court in Pyott Ltd v CIR (13 S..VC 121 at 126) :
the whole business of our taxation was changed in 
1917 . Under the Act of 1914 , the subject of the
charge was "profits or gains" , and it was consequently 
the same as it is still today in England . But since 
1917 , we have had In South Africa an artificial and
purely statutory definition of "taxable income" , 
derived ultimately from the definition of "gross 
income" as set out above - that is , the total {'mount 
of receipts and accruals excluding those of a capital 
nature from any source within the Union (or deemed to 
be such) , and it is by no means necessarily synonymous 
with "profits or gains".... What has to be ascertained 
is the "taxable income" , and this has to be 
ascertained in the manner prescribed by the Act and in
Although this case dealt with the predecessor to the 
Act in force at present , the determination of "gross 
income" is carried out in essentially the same manner . 
"Gross income" is defined in section 1 of the Act (all 
references to a section hereinafter , refer to a 
section of the Income Tax Act , unless otherwise 
indicated) as being :
"....the total amount , in cash or otherwise , received
by or accrued to or in favour of such person during
such year or period of assessment from a source within
or deemed to be within the Republic , excluding
receipts or accruals of a captial nature...".
It is evident frum this definition that there are two 
occasions on which income may fall into a taxpayer's 
gross income , that is either when it is received or 
when it accrues . The significance of this portion of 
the definition of gross income is that it determines
the timing of the recognition of the income . As is the 
case with many other aspects of the Act , the courts 
have been called upon to interpret the meaning of the 
words "accrued to". One of the earliest cases to 
examine the meaning of "accrued to" is the case of 
Lategan v CIR (2 SATC 16) . This case established a 
legal precedent still in force , determining that 
accrued means "become entitled to" . In subseguent 
cases (CIR v Delfos , 6 SATC 92 and Hersov's Estate v
CIR , 21 SATC 106) it was suggested that the meaning of 
accrued is "become due and payable".
In the case of Mooi v SIR (34 SATC 1 , at 10) Ogilvie- 
Thomson CJ described the differing opinions regarding 
the meaning of "accrued to" as "this controversial 
question". However , the learned Chief Justice did not 
find it necessary to resolve this controvers- 
It is evident, therefore, that tl jtlll
uncertainty after more than three quarters of a century 
of examination as to the meaning of "accrued to" as 
used in the gross income definition. The absence of 
clarity on this point violates the fundamental 
principle of certainty described in the opening 
paragraph o£ this chapter, furthermore, as "gross 
income" is the starting point for the determination of 
liability for taxation under the artificial method of 
income determination employed by the Act, it is evident 
that this is the cornerstone of the tax, and the 
importance of achieving certainty in this regard is 
obvious.
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«2. THE AIM AND METHOD OB’ THE RESEARCH
This study is aimed, primarily, at demonstrating that 
t.he present state of the law regarding the- meaning of 
accrual leads to results that are plagued with 
problems. Although there are a number of different 
aspects that may be examined In determining the meaning 
of "accrued to" in the gross income definition in 
section l of the Act, the focus of this study is on the 
timing of revenue recognition for the purposes of the 
Act, as well as the measurement of the quantum of 
income which has accrued prior to receipt.
This study has been conducted by examining and 
analysing :
1. The basic concepts relating to the timing of income 
recognition
2. The methods of accruing income in selected foreign 
tax jurisdictions
3. The current state of the law in South Africa
4. The anomalies and shortfalls in the Interpretations 
of "accrued t o", as established by thti courts, and 
the recommendations formulated by toe Margo 
Commission
The research has been concluded by :
6. Providing an interpretation of the curvsm state of 
the law regarding the meaning of "accrued to"
*6* Evaluating the current state of the 
reference to the theoretically desirable 
identified in this report
7. Formulating recommendations relating to 
of income recognition for taxation purpos
features
th ' timing 
is in South
3. THE TIMING OF REVENUE RECOGNITION - BASIC CONCEPTS
The early economists identified land, labour and 
capital as being the three factors of production, t'he 
rewards attributable to these factors are rent, , wages 
and interest, and in a perfectly functioning economy 
these three factors should account for all of the 
income from production. They concluded that any 
residual income (over and above the rent, wages and 
interest) is du • to the imperfections of the system. As 
economic theory developed entrepreneurship was 
identified as baing s fourth factor of production, the 
compensation for which is profit (Myers, 1959).
Profits are earned over the operating cycle of the 
business enterprise, and it may be difficult to measure 
income on a periodic basis. Storey (1960) claims that 
the determination of periodic net income is the most 
important function of financial accounting. He is of 
the opinion that the basic step in the solution of 
income measurement problems is: "tha achievement of an
understanding of the nature of income and of the income 
determination process”.
An examination of the nature of income and of the 
income determination process, as established by 
economists and accountants, demonstrates the evolution
In thinking that has resulted in a set of guidelines 
which could be used for the measurement of income for 
taxation purposes.
3.1. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
When an economist speaks of income, the teem is used in 
approximately the same sense as when the word is used 
in everyday language. However many attempts have been 
made to give the term a precise meaning. Economists 
recognise that income is to a large degree intangible, 
being a flow of satisfactions (Haig, 1921).
The definition of income as being a flow of benefits 
during a period of tins was acknowledged by other 
economists, Fisher (1911) end El y (1906) who claim : 
"Wealth refers to the stock of goods on hand at a 
particular time. Real income, on the other han d , has 
reference to the satisfaction we derive from the use of 
material things or personal services duing a period of
In his study, Haig considered the writings of Fisher 
and Ely, but was not satisfied that the flows of 
intangibles could be measured without the aid of some 
common unit. Haig approved of the conclusion reached by 
Taussig (1916) : for almost all purposes of
economic study, it is best to content ourselves with a
statement, and an attempt at measurement, in terms not 
of utility but of money income....•The reason for this 
rejection of a principle which is in itself sound lies 
in the conclusion .... regarding total utility and 
comsufiter’s surplus : They cannot be measured." Haig was 
then able to conclude that : "Income is the money value 
of the net accretion to one's economic power between 
two points of time". This definition was added to by 
Simons(1921), who suggested that the consumption and 
the net change in wealth should be evaluated at market 
prices, with the latter (wealth) being computed on an 
accrual rather than on a realised basis.
It is evident that there are a number of problems 
associated with the definition of income used by 
economists that may be encountered when income 
measurement is attempted..The change in wealth involves 
a valuation of assets at two points in time. The 
determination of market values may not be possible if 
the assets in question are not readily tradeable 
(White, 1959). It may also be found that the quoted 
values of tradeable assets may not be appropriate. 
Values of assets may fluctuate over time as a result of 
changes in price levels. The effect of inflation give 
rise to fictitious gains in monetary value rather than 
real capital accumulation (Goode, 1964). Finally, this 
broad view of income would include the increase in 
wealth from all sources, including receipts such as
donations and Inheritances which are obviously 
no f e a r n e d "  from the economic performance of the 
individual.
3.2. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
The people whose function it is to measure income, 
accountants, have had to adapt the economic concepts in 
order to achieve a definition of Income that may be 
applied in practice. In doing so, they have inevitably 
bastardised the pure economic concept of income. 
Economists define income in terms of value, essentially 
dependent upon expectations about the future. 
Accountants look in the opposite direction and define 
income in terms of the past. They rely on completed 
transactions to provide a factual value that has 
actually been implemented. In addition to the problems 
with the economic concept of Income that have already 
been highlighted, accountants see a further problem in 
that the economic concept lacks objectivity and 
accuracy in the measurement of periodic income. The 
primary difference between the two concepts of income 
is the criterion of realisation (Sommerfeld, Anderson 
and Brock, 1979) .
The accountants are concerened with the valuation of 
assets at a specific point in time, and the measurement 
of income during a fixed period. They therefore take a
"snapshot" of the business entity, which creates 
numerous problems and is becoming a source of concern 
to many account,'ng academics. The main criticism of 
periodic reporting is that the financial periods do not 
necessarily coincide with the transaction cycle of the 
reporting entity. Do the transactions of the entity 
mature instantaneously , or is there a process of 
realisation in which a gradual earning of the income 
takes place? This problem has not been fully resolved 
by the accounting theorists, however practical methods 
of handling the problem have been developed.
The recognition of income for accounting purposes has 
been described by Davidson, Hanouille, Stickney and 
Hail <1995) as involving "a timing question - wher ,.t 
is recognised- and a measurement question - how much 
recognised The timing and the quantum of income can
only be determined when all, or a substantial portion, 
of the relevant transaction has been completed, and 
when cash, a receivable, or some other asset 
susceptible to reasonably precise measurement has been 
received (Davidson et al, p302).
Accountants have developed a set of guidelines to be 
followed in the measurement of the quantum and timing 
of income in their Accounting Standards. In South 
Africa the statement of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice, AC ill, entitled "Revenue Recognition",
"snapshot" of the business entity, which creates 
numerous problems and is becoming a source of concern 
to many accounting academics. The main criticism of 
periodic reporting is that the financial periods do not 
necessarily coincide with the transaction cycle of the 
reporting entity. Do the transactions of the entity 
mature instantaneously , or is there a process of 
realisation in which a gradual earning of the income 
takes place? This problem has not been fully resolved 
by the accounting theorists, however practical methods 
of handling the problem have been developed.
The recognition of income for accounting purposes has 
been described by Davidson, Hanouilie, Stickney and 
Weil (19B5) as involving "a timing guestion - when it 
is recognised- and a measurement guestion - how much is 
recognised The timing and the quantum of income can
only be determined when all, or a substantial portion, 
of the relevant transaction has been completed, and 
when cash, a receivable, or some other asset 
susceptible to reasonably precise measurement has been 
received (Davidson et al, p302).
Accountants have developed a set of guidelines to be 
followed in the measurement of the quantum and timing 
of Income in their Accounting Standards. In South 
Africa the statement of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice, AC 111, entitled "Revenue Recognition",
issued by the South African .nsitute of Chartered 
Accountants with effect from 1 January 1985 is the 
relevant set of guidelines. The following extracts from 
this statement are pertinent to the matter at han d :
"Revenue recognition is mainly concerned- with when 
revenue is recognised in the income statement .of an 
enterprise. Although the act of delivery is an 
essential element in determing when legal ownership 
passes, this statement permits earlier recognition of 
revenue if the transaction is substantially complete" 
(paragraph 9).
"The amount of revenue arising on a transaction is 
usually determined by agreement between the parties 
involved in the transaction. Where uncertainties exist 
regarding the determination of the revenue, or costs 
incurred relating to that revenue, these uncertainties 
may influence the timing of revenue recognition" 
(paragraph 9).
"Where the uncertainty relates to collectibility and 
arises subsequent to the time of sale or the rendering 
of the service, it is more appropriate to make a 
separate provision to reflect the uncertainty than to 
adjust the amount of revenue originally recorded" 
(paragraph 23).
"In a transaction involving the sale of goods, 
performance should be regarded as being achieved when
the seller has transferred to the buyer the significant 
risks and rewards of ownership. In a transaction 
involving the rendering of servicas, performance should 
be regarded as the execution of an act or the passage 
of time and revenue should be recognised either under 
the completed contract method or under the percentage 
of completion method, whichever relates the revenue to 
the work accomplished" (paragraph 30).
"Revenue.....should be regarded as being measurable 
when no significant uncertainty exists regarding the 
consideration that will be derived from the sale of the 
goods, the rendering of services or from the use by 
others of enterprise resources,...." (paragraph 31).
"For an exchange of nonmonetary assets the fair value
of the assets or services exchanged Is normally used to 
determine the amount of revenue involved. For this 
purpose fair value Is defined as the amount for which 
an asset could be exchanged between a knowledgeable,
willing buyer and a knowledgeable, willing seller in an 
arms length transaction. Where the fair value of the
assets on one side of the transaction Is determinable, 
that fair value is used In determining the amount of
revenue involved in an exchange of dissimilar assets.
Exchanges of similar non-monetary assets or services
are not regarded as transactions which generate
revenue" (paragraph 28).
It is evident from these extracts from the Accounting 
Statement that accountants are committed to the concept 
of realisation in order to provide an objective measure 
(as far as is practically possible) to be applied in 
recognising the quantum and timing of revenue. The 
economic theory of income Is openly sacrificed in the 
name of objectivity.
3.3. TAXATION PRINCIPLES
In chapter 1 the artificial nature of income 
determination for tax purposes was highlighted. 
Givens(1966) has suggested that the: "problem of
differences between taxable income and book income 
could be generally ignored if accountants and the 
business community would recognise that the income tax 
is not a tax on Income. It is, rather, a general 
business tax, based on income only in so far as the 
book income ic the starting point used in determining 
the taxable base". He is of the opinion that the 
recognition of this would "free accountants from the 
impossible task of trying to find a significant 
relationship where none exists".
Although income for tax purposes is not necessarily 
Income for accounting purposes, there are areas of 
common ground, particularly, it is submitted, in South 
Africa. Just as accounting Income was derived by
shearing the hazy £--lnges from economic income, so too 
was taxable inco-?J derived by clipping out the 
accounting concepts : -.'capable uf codification.
The characteristics of income that are important from 
the point of view of tax policy have been identified as
being (Sommerfald et al, 1978):
1. Wherewithal to pay
2. Realisation and objectivity
3. Equity and uniformity among taxpayers
4. Ease and consistency of administration
5. Serial and economic objectives
(These aspects are discussed in detail in chapter 4)
From the description of the three concepts of Income, 
economic income, accounting income and tax income, it 
is evident that the definition of economic income is
the .broadest. Accounting income could be seen as a sub­
set of economic income, as it excludes items of income 
that cannot be measured with accuracy. A significant 
portion of the income that is recognised for accounting 
purposes would constitute a substantial part of tax 
income, the differences between the two being the items 
excluded or included In terms of the five aspects 
detailed above. It is evident that there are areas that 
are common to all three concepts of income, and that 
accounting income and tax income concepts have been 
derived from the concept of economic income.
Give n s ' contention that there is no significant 
relationship between accounting income and tax income, 
other than that accounting income is the starting point 
in the determination of tax income, it is submitted, in 
the South African context, it is not altogether 
correct. The fact that accounting income is the 
starting point indicates tha„ there must be at least 
some common ground, otherwise some other starting point 
would have been chosen.
The use of accounting income as the starting point for 
the determination of tax income has arisen, not from 
the Act, but from common practice and the method 
adopted in the Return of Income (IT 14) that is 
required to be submitted to the South African Revenue 
authorities in respect of corporate taxpayers.
It is acknowledged that the artificial basis of income 
determination for the purposes of the Act begins with 
the determination of "gross income", with exempt 
income being deducted, to arive at "income", and then 
deductions and allowances are subtracted to result in 
"taxable income".
The method that accountants traditionally use to 
determine income may be found in the income statement. 
A detailed income statement may be broken down into two 
broad areas, income and expenditure, with the latter
being deducted from the former to achieve the result of 
"net Income before tax".
It Is evident that the tax and the accounting methods 
of determining Income are roughly similar - both begin 
with a measure of gross receipts and then deduct 
certain items. It Is the'measure of gross receipts that 
is of significance to this study. The similarities, and 
the important differences, between the measure of gross 
receipts for accounting purposes and for the purposes 
of taxation are examined in detail in the following 
chapter.
4t. RECOGNITION OP REVENUE FOR TAXATION PURPOSES
The differences between the recognition of income for 
accounting purposes and for taxation purposes have 
arisen from many varied influences. The major 
influences are the underlying body of economic and
legal philosophies of the lecislature, variations in 
the interpretation of the law by the courts, and the 
increasing use of tax policy as an instrument of
economic planning and control {Sommerfeld et al, 1979).
4.1. WHEREWITHAL TO PAY
The "ability to pay" principle has been accepted as 
being fundamental to taxation philosophy for many
years. This concept denotes the Idea that the more a 
taxpayer earns, the more taxation he should pay. 
However in the context of this study an apparently 
similar phrase, "wherewithal to pay", has a different
meaning. Cohen (1966) describes the latter phrase: "As
a practical matter, the timing of the tax should occur 
when the taxpayer can most readily pay and the I.R.S. 
can most readily collect".
It can be seen that the principle of wherewithal to pay
requires that the taxpayer must not only have the
ability to pay (ie. have earned the income) , but must
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also have the money to finance the tax payment. This 
principle explains many of the circumstances where 
income recognition for tax purposes differs from thp 
accounting treatment. Where income is received prior to 
it being earned, it should generally be recognised for 
tax purposes (although not for accounting purposes). 
This method of taxation is presumably designed to 
ensure that the tax will be collected, as the taxpayer 
has the cash available at the time of receipt, but may 
no longer have the wherewithal to pay at a later time 
when the Income is finally earned. Alternatively, the 
taxpayer may still have the funds at the later date, 
but may have departed from the tax jurisdiction by that 
later date (Sommerfeld et al , 1978).
On the other hand, the wherewithal to pay principle 
would enable a taxpayer to defer the recognition of 
income for taxation purposes in the case of exchange or 
barter-type transactions. In the event that income is 
earned by the conversion of property, for example when 
land, is exchanged for shares, it is evident that the 
taxpayer may have to dispose of a part of the asset 
received in exchange in order to finance the payment of 
taxation on the profit (although the possibility of 
borrowing, using the asset as collateral, may negate 
the necessity to sell the assst)-
The wherewithal to pay principle is only applied to a 
certain degree in the Act. In the gross income 
definition in section 1 amounts "received by or accrued 
to" a taxpayer are brought into account. It is evident 
that if a taxpayer receives income before it is earned, 
he is liable for tax thereon. However, on the other 
side of the coin the principle is ignored in that the 
gross income definition brings into account amounts 
received "in cash or otherwise” . Thus, even though a 
taxpayer may have received an asset other than cash, be 
would still be liable to pay tax (in cas h ) on the 
income < section 24A alleviates this problem only in 
certain circumstances).
4.2. REALISATION AND OBJECTIVITY
The concept of realisation which was raised in chapter 
3.2., is closely related to the principle of 
wherewithal to pay. The realisation criterion requires 
that Income only be recognised when it is realised 
through a conversion into new assets or a liquidation 
of existing liabilities (Sommerfeld et al , 1978).
It can be seen that an increase in the value of an 
asset, even if it is readily measurable, should not be 
subjected to income tax. Thus where a sharedealer 
benefits from an increase in the market value of his 
shares, he has no income to be taxed until such time as
i
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he realises the gain by converting the shares to cash 
or some other asset. At the same time, declines in the 
value of assets are generally recognised, even though 
they are unrealised, if the assets in question consist 
of the floating capital of the business. This principle 
therefore creates an inconsistency in the treatment of 
unrealised changes in value.
Apart from the link with the wherewithal to pay 
principle, the realisation concept is also firmly 
founded upon the principle of certainty described in 
chapter 1. This comes about because of the objectivity 
that arises from the realisation concept which 
provides accuracy and certainty in both the quantum and 
timing of income recognition. The realisation concept 
applied for purposes of taxation is very similar to its 
use by accountants, however one important exception 
exists. In the case of exchange or barter transactions 
income may not necessarily be recognised for accounting 
purposes, but it is necessary to recognise the income 
for tax purposes (in practical terms this difference 
may have an ins’ignifleant effect in South Africa as the 
exceptions would normally result in "capital" income 
which would be excluded from gross income). Even 
though this is contrary to the wherewithal to pay 
principle, from a practical point of view it is 
necessary to recognise income at the date of exchange 
to prevent the tax avoidance that would otherwise arise
by "rolling" income from year to year by way of 
exchange rather than sale.
Therefore, In the event of an exchange of assets, the
revenue authorities have, as a matter of necessity, to
forego the objectivity consideration, as well as the 
wherewithal to pay principle, in order to close a 
"loophole" that could possibly be very expensive in 
terms of delayed tax collections.
The effect of the transaction cycle is also of 
importance to the recognition of income for tas 
purposes. In considering the concept at realisation one 
must consider when transactions are actually complete. 
Is there a stage in the transaction when it can be said 
that the income is actually earned? It is unlikely 
that the timing of the assessment period will coincide 
with the earnings cycle. Irrespective of when the 
transaction or earnings cycles mature, there will
always be a need to have a cut-off date if taxable 
income is to be determined regularly. It is submitted 
that the need to fix the determination of tax
chargeable on a regular basis,normally on an annual 
basis, is so important that the problems that arise 
from the periodic income determination process have to 
he accepted.
EQUITY AND UNIFORMITY
igardedThe concept of equity in taxatli
conceptbeing fundamental to any
that equal incomes should be;
(Sommerfied et al
principle has been sacrificed in many instance;
specifically provides for the unequal tax
ihile the same typi
depending upon the identity
apparent violations
justified or rati;
of greater importance than the
;emption
if interest paid by the Post Office attracts
illowing the payment of Interest at
hand with the idea of equity and uniformity
'ith adequate
disputes
lived" (Cohei 1966). The achievement of this goal
I
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may require greater divergence between accounting
measures of income and the tax recognition.
The tax requirements for the recognition of income may 
be less flexible than the accounting rules because 
strict rules are capable of being administered more 
easily. The differences that arise because of the need 
for administrative convenience should result in more 
uniform results being achieved among different 
taxpayers, as fewer subjective judgements would be 
required (Shapiro, 1959). Accountants are specifically 
requested (in AC 101) to apply the spirit rather than 
the letter of the accounting standards. Taxpayers could 
hardly be requested to apply some sort of fiscal spirit 
(especially in the South African context).
4.5. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES
It would seem that the tax system is being used to an
aver increasing extent to achieve specific social or
economic objectives. This aspect was touched upon 
briefly in chapter 4.3., in respect of interest income 
that is exempt from tax.
Social or economic goals may be attained by measures 
that permanently affect the taxation payments by 
certain classes of taxpayers. There is considerable 
criticism about the use of tax legislation in this
manner, while It must be acknowledged that this may be 
a very effective economic tool. The use of the tax 
legislation to achieve social and economic goals may be 
a further cause for differences existing between the 
recognition of income for tax purposes and the 
accounting income recognition {Sommerfeld et al, 1976).
This aspect may have some impact on the recognition of 
income in certain foreign tax jurisdictions, but should 
not have a significant effect on the South African 
income tax. The artificial structure of tax 
determination used in South Africa ensures that the 
income is first recognised as "gross income", and the 
social and economic objectives are achieved by a later 
exemption of the income, or by the granting of a 
special deduction or allowance.
manner, while it must, be acknowledged that this may be 
a very effective economic tool. The use of the tax 
legislation to achieve social and economic goals may be 
a further cause for differences existing between the 
recognition of income for tax purposes and the 
accounting income recognition (Sommerfeld et al, 1979).
This aspect may have some impact on the recognition of 
income in certain foreign tax jurisdictions, but should 
not have a significant effect on the South African 
income tax. The artificial structure of tax 
determination used in South Africa ensures that the 
income is first, recognised as "gross income", and the 
social and economic objectives are achieved by a later 
exemption of the income, or by the granting of a 
special deduction or allowance.
6. REVENUE RECOGNITION IN CERTAIN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
The examination of any problem may be assisted by 
considering the experience of others who have faced 
similar problems. It is therefore considered 
appropriate to examine how revenue is recognised for 
tax purposes in other countries. For the purposes of 
this study only three other tax jurisdictions will be 
examined, namely Australia, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. From a brief preliminary 
examination it is evident that the experience of 
countries other than those mentioned may be of some 
value to the examination being undertaken. However, 
they have been excluded from this study because certain 
practical difficulties were encountered.
The study of the foreign tax jurisdictions has been 
limited to countries: that use English as their official 
language. The problem encountered with non-English tax 
law is that there is a limited source of material 
available in English, and what is available is of 
little benefit as It is generally very brief. Also the 
supply of good source material (court cases, 
commentaries, articles and reference books) available 
in local libraries is mainly limited to the three 
countries being examined. In the event that further 
research is undertaken in this field, it is suggested
that the examination of foreign tax jurisdictions be 
extended to include other sophisticated tax regimes.
8.1. AUSTRALIA
Income tax is levied upon the income derived during the 
year by a taxpayer in terms of section 17 of the 
Australian Income tax legislation (Mannix and Mannix, 
1992). Section 19 of this act deems certain income to 
have been derived: "19. Income shall be deemed to have
been derived by a person although it is not actually 
paid over to him but is reinvested, accuaulated, 
capitalised, carried to any reserve, sinking fund or 
insurance find however designated, or otherwise dealt 
with on his behalf or as he directs".
In the case of COT v Executor Trustee 5. Agency ua. of
S.A. (5 ATD 98, at 133) it was said that ”ths ward 
"derived" is the equivalent of "arising" sr 
"accruing" Mannix and Mannix (1982) eKpla-ti tkat
income arising from business transactions is dErived 
"as and when the contract which gives rise to the 
income is completed, but not to the extent that pajzant 
has been made under the contract". The effect of this 
interpretation of derivation of income by a business is 
that businesses are assessed on a credit basis, i.e. 
there are brought to account moneys owing as at the end 
of the year of income in respect of transactions 
completed in the year of income, and similarly where
money has been brought to account in a year of income 
an adjustment is necessary in the next year of Income 
where moneys are received in that year. The actuai 
receipt of money is not a derivation of the income".
In the case of Australian Machinery &• Investment 
Company Ltd v DFCT (B ATD 61, at 65) the court found : 
"Since the appellant company was carrying on the 
business of trading in shares, its profits should be 
ascertained, not by the cash-basis mode but by the 
earnings-basls mode, which is the usual mode applicable 
to the assessment of profits of a trading business 
which buys and sells..... Any income derived from the 
Comet transaction which is liable to Federal income tax 
is liable in the year in which the appellant company 
b e c a m e .lecallv entitled.to the immediate receipt of the 
moneys which created the profit, not necessarily the 
year in which the contract was made or the year in 
which the moneys were actually received" (underlining 
added).
In J.Rowe & Son Pty Ltd v FCT (2 ATR 297) the 
transactions in question involved the sale of retail 
goods on extended credit terms, with interest being 
charged on the outstanding balance on the account. The 
court decided that the profit from the sale was derived 
in the year in which the sale took place, while the 
interest was assessable as and when received over the 
period of the time of the repayments.
Wallschutzky (1986) notes that the ruJ es for the 
derivation of income cannot be generally applied. Each 
type of income must be considered and the appropriate 
treatment, according to the circumstances of each case, 
should be applied. It appears as if a wealth of case 
law has been accumulated to cater for the derivation of 
the many different types of income.
Section 21 of the Australian taxing statute deals with 
transactions where the consideration g van is not cash. 
The market value of the asset at the time it is 
received is used in the determination of the 
assessable income (Mannix and Mannix, 1982).
6.2. UNITED KINGDOM
In the computation of profits, for the purposes of 
determining income tax arising from the carrying on of 
trading operations , the general rule followed is that 
the amounts "earned" must be taken into account, and 
not only amounts received (Pinson, 1980) . The question 
of the timing of revenue recognition was addressed in 
the case of J.P. Hall & Co ltd v IRC (12 TC 382) in 
respect of a transaction involving the sale of goods. 
In this case the court found that the profits arose, 
not at the date of the contract, but at the date of 
delivery of the goods.
revenue should be recognised for tax purposes may 
differ from one transaction to another, and that the 
decision in the J.P. Hall case is not necessarily of 
general application. Tiley (1985) states that the date 
on which income is earned depends upon the terms of the 
particular contract. It is only when all the conditions 
precedent to earnl-.g the income have been fulfilled 
that the income should be recognised for tax purposes. 
This principle was confirmed in the cases of Johnson v 
M.S. Try Ltd (27 TC 167) and Willingale v International 
Commercial Bank Ltd (1978 STC 75). In both of these 
cases the recognition of income was delayed until the 
year in which the proceed- from the transaction were 
actually realised.
The rule generally applicable to the sale of goods on 
credit is described in Simon's Taxes as follows! 
"Normally an Item becomes a trade receipt on the day 
when it becomes a debt'receivable even though the date 
of receipt is postponed. Accordingly, when a sale is 
made, the sale price has to be brought into account at 
that date, and it will from part of the total of the 
sales in the profit and loss account for the then 
current period; and that will be so even if the sum is 
not paid to the trader until after the end of the
current accounting period  The debts remaining due
to the trader at the end of the accounting period in
question are brought in at their full face values 
except to the extent that they are then bad or 
doubtful."
It is interesting to note that there is a mechanism in 
the U.K. tax system to provide, to a certain extent, 
for the matching of income and expenditure for tax 
purposes. Thn matching concept, which is one the 
fundamentals of accounting, is generally disregarded by 
the artificial method of recognising income for tax 
purposes. Tiley (1985) explains that this matching 
mechanism (referred to as the doctrine of relating 
back) "matches receipts with the moment the services 
have been rendered or the goods supplied, and not with 
the moment that a legally enforceable right to payment 
arises". The consequences of the relating back 
principle is that, generally speaking, income earned 
subsequent to the incurring of the associated 
expenditure may be moved back in time , for the 
purposes of revenue recognition for tax purposes, so 
as to coincide with the time of incurral of the 
expenditure. This matching principle does not apply to 
receipts or accruals that occur prior to the outlay of 
the expenditure.
In circumstances where the taxpayer receives income in 
the form of an asset, rather than money, the amount 
recognised as income for tax purposes is based on the
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actual value of the asset received. The case of Gold 
Coast Selection Trust Ltd v Humphrey (30 TC 209) 
established the general principle to be followed:
"In cases ouch as this, when a trader In the course of 
his trade receives a new and valuable asset, not being 
money, as the result at sale or exchange, that asset, 
for the purpose of computing the annual profits or 
gains arising or accruing to him from his trade, should 
be valued as at the end of the accounting period in 
which it was received, even though it is neither 
realised nor realisable till later. The fact that it 
cannot be realised at once may reduce its present 
value, but that is no reason for treating it, for the 
purposes of income tax, as though it had no value
until it could be realised  If the asset is
difficult to value but is none the less of a money 
value, the best valuation possible must be made. 
Valuation is an art, not an exact science. Mathematical 
certainty is not demanded, nor, indeed, is it possible. 
It is for the Commissioners to express in the money 
value attributed by them to the asset their estimate, 
and this is a conclusion of fact to be drawn from the 
evidence before them".
5.3. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Internal Revenue Code , in section 61(a) , defines 
gross income as being : "all income from whatever
source derived". The recognition of Income Is permitted 
on a number of bases, including the accrual or the cash 
methods, in terms of section 446 of the Code. It has 
been recognised that no single method of accounting can 
be prescribed for all taxpayers. Each taxpayer is 
entitled to adopt the method of recognising income that 
is best suited to his needs. However, the method 
adopted must reflect income clearly and consisently 
(Treasury Regulations, s 1.446-1). The accrual basis 
must be used by certain types of taxpayers, especially 
taxpayers with inventories of stock in trade 
(Sommerfeld et al, 1976).
The Treasury Department has provided the following 
Interpretation of the gross income definition:
"Gross income includes income realised in any form, 
whether in money, property or services. Income may be 
realised, therefore, in the form of services, meals, 
accomodations, stock, or other property, as well as in 
cash" (Treasury Regulations, s i .16-1(a)). It is evident 
that this interpretation relies on the realisation 
concept. EssentiallyrthBce must be the receipt of cash, 
some other asset, or a right. This view has received 
the support of the courts. For instance, in Eisner v 
Macomber (262 U.S. 199), the Supreme Court said:
"Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing 
to capital, not a growth or Increment of value in the 
investment: but a gain, a profit, something of
exchangeable value proceeding from the property, 
severed from the capital however invested or employed, 
and coming in, being "derived", that is, received or 
drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate 
use, benefit and disposal; - that is income derived 
from property. Nothing else answers the description".
In determining gross income, it is not necessary that 
the exact amount of income be known for it to be 
accounted for. As long as it is possible to make a 
reasonable estimate of the amount accrued, the estimate 
should be used. Any difference between the estimate and 
the exact amount received in the later year is to be 
taken into account in that later year (Standard Federal 
Tax Reporter, p 35, 122).
It should be noted that apart from the requirement that 
the amount of the income must be determinable with 
reasonable accuracy, there is a further requirement. 
All the events that ensure the right to receive the 
income must have occurred in order for the income to be 
recognised for tax purposes.
The gross income of a taxpayer who uses the accrual 
basis should include sales during the year, which are 
etil unpaid at the end of the year of assessment, at 
their face value (Charles C. Lewis Co v U.S., 36-1 USTC 
9219). In the cases of Spring City Foundry Co v Com (4
JhaA r mad'
1USTC 1276) and Helvering v Enright (41-1 0S1C 9356) it 
was found that the time when accrual takes place is 
when the right to receive payment arises, and not at 
the time of the actual receipt.
5.4, COMMON ASPECTS
Although each of the three foreign tax jurisdictions 
discussed is unique, there are certain aspects relating 
to the recognition of income that are common to all. 
The first important similarity is that income is 
admitted for tax purposes when the taxpayer becomes 
entitled to receipt of the amount, irrespective of 
whether the payment is due in that tax year. Secondly, 
income that has been taken to account, but has not been 
received by the year end, is recognised at the face 
value of the debt. And thirdly, when income is received 
or accrued in a form other than cash (excluding debts), 
the value of the asset, at the date of receipt or 
accrual, is taken into account.
i
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6. GROSS INCOME DEFINITION
6.1. HISTORY
The history of the law regarding income tax, and 
specifically the method of recognising income, is of 
relevance to this study as a number of the important 
court decisions were made in terms of legislation that 
has changed over the years.
Prior to the Union of South Africa being established 
there was no taxation of income in the Transvaal and 
Orange Free State. However, in Natal and the Cape of 
Good Hope there was an income tax imposed on 
individuals and companies. The Mining Taxation Act (Act 
No. 6 of 1910) consolidated the law regarding mining 
taxation for the Union, and the first general income 
tax was imposed by the Income Tax Act, No. 28 of 1914.
The income tax and mining tax laws were consolidated in 
1917 (by Act No. 41 of 1917). The next consolidated Act 
was Act No. 40 of 1925, followed by the Income Tax Act, 
No. 31 of 1941. The 1941 Act remained, with regular 
amendments, until the present Income Tax Act (No. B8 of 
1962 ) was brought into force (Isaacs, Fielding and 
Lazar, 1963).
The Cape of Good Hope Act No 34 of 1904 levied a tax 
based on: "any gains or profits derived or received by
any company or person in any year or by any means from
any source within this Colony, and includes profits,
gains, rents, interest, salaries ...... ". The
Additional Tax Act (No. 36 or 1904} refined this method 
of taxing by moving from the "gains or profits derived"
base to "a tax based on .... incomes arising or
accruing In Natal the income tax (In terms of
Act No. 33 of 1906) was based on "gains or profits
derived or received" (Edmonson, 1986).
The Income Tax Act of 1914 provided for " a tax to
be charged, levied and collected throughout the Union 
on Taxable Income which has been received by or accrued
to or in favour of any person H (Bdmunson, 1986).
In this Act, income was defined as "gains or profits". 
The "gains or profits" basis of determining Income was 
discarded when the Act was redrafted. The artificial 
method of determining Income was introduced, with 
income being defined as "what remains of the gross 
income after certain deductions", in the 191? Act. 
Gross income was defined in this Act as being "the 
total amount received by or accrued to or in favour of 
any person other than receipts or accruals of a capital
nature  and includes rents, interest, salaries
.... whether in money or otherwise"(de Koker, 1983).
The Cape of Good Hope Act No 34 of 1904 levied a tax
based on: "any ga.'.ns or profits derived or received by
any company ot person In any year or by any means from 
any source within this Colony, and includes profits,
gains, rents, interest, salaries .............The
Additional Tax Act (No. 36 or 1904) refined this method 
of taxing by moving from the "gains or profits derived"
base to "a tax based on  incomes arising or
accruing In Natal the income tax (in terms of
Act No. 33 of 1908) was based on "gains or profits 
derived or received" (Edmunson, 1966).
The Income Tax Act of 1914 provided for " a tax to
be charged, levied and collected throughout the Onion 
on Taxable Income which has been received by or accrued
to or in favour of any person " (Edmunson, 1966).
In this Act, income was defined as "gains or profits". 
The "gains or profits" basis of determining income was 
discarded when the Act was redrafted. The artificial 
method of determining income was introduced, with 
income being defined as "what remains of the gross
income after certain deductions", tn the 1917 Act.
Gross Income was defined in this Act as being "the
total amount received by or accrued to or in favour of 
any person other than receipts or accruals of a capital 
nature..... and includes rents, interest, salaries 
.... whether in money or otherwise"(de Koker, 1963).
The 1925 Income Tan Act defined gross income as being 
the total amount whether in cash or otherwise received 
by or accrued to any person, other than receipts or 
accruals of a capital nature. It would appear that the 
addition of the phrase "in cash or otherwise" may have 
assisted in clarifying the definition to some extent, 
but there still remained considerable problems, as far 
as the courts were concerned. In 1932, in the case of 
Ochberg v GIR (6 SATC 1 at 6) Watermeyer J. stated that 
this "apparently simple definition bristles with 
difficulties".
There have bee; 
income defInltloi
no material amendments to the gross 
since the 1925 Act.
6.2. THE LATEGAN PRINCIPLE
The important role that the courtit play in the South 
African tax system requires that a close examination of 
the relevant court decisions be made. The most 
important decision handed down by the courts to date 
regarding the accrual of income is that of W.H. Lategan 
v GIR (2 SATC 16) . This case was one of the first to 
deal with the subject, and is generally regarded as 
having created legal precedent that is still intact. 
The principle established in this case has come to be 
known as the "Lategau Principle".
The ease dealt with the year of assessment ended on 30 
June 1920, and was therefore subject to the provisions 
of the 1917 Act. The relevant portion of the gross 
income definition .accrued to or in favour of...") 
remains unaltered in the current legislation.
The taxpayer in this case, Lategan, was a wine farmer 
who had, during the year of assessment in question, 
sold wine to a co-operative (KWV) of which he was a 
member. A portion of the selling price was payable, 
subject to certain deductions, during the tax year, 
while the balance was payable in instalments subsequent 
to the end of the tax year. The aforementioned 
deductions comprised two elements, namely "retention" 
and "contribution" monies. These deductions were made 
in terms of the KWV's constitution for the purpose of 
providing working capital for the co-operative, as well 
as to finance the annual expenditure. Lategan was 
entitled to receive shares in KWV in return for a 
portion of the deductions.
In assessing the taxpayer, the Commissioner included 
the full selling price in the gross income, and allowed 
to be deducted only the portion of the ahovementioned 
deductions that were in respect of the contribution 
towards the KWV's annual costs.
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9On appeal against the decision of the Special Court, 
the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court was 
faced with two questions to answer. Firstly, whether 
the instalments payable after the end of the tax year 
constituted gross income, and secondly, whether the 
retention monies deducted by KWV were gross income or 
alternatively whether these monies qualified for 
deduction. It is the first question that is of prime 
importance to this research.
In analysing the gross income definition Matermeyer J 
determined that the word "amount" in the definition had 
to be given a wide meaning so as to include not only 
money, but also the value of property received by or 
accrued to a taxpayer, as long as it has a money value. 
This view would then result in the value of any form of 
property, including debts and rights of action, being 
included in gross income.
The appellant argued that the debt payable after the 
end of the tax year was not an amount that had "accrued 
to" him during the year. But the learned Judge was of 
the opinion that the words in the Act "has accrued to 
or in favour of any person" meant "to which he has 
become entitled". Following this logic, it was found 
that Lategan had accrued a right to receive payment 
after the year end. This right was his income, and had 
to be valued for the purposes of inclusion in gross
income. Therefore, the amount to be taken to account 
was not the face value of the febt outstanding at the 
year and, but was the value of .he debt at the year 
end (i.e. the face value less some deduction to bring 
the debt to its present worth at that date).
It is evident that three Important aspects regarding 
the gross income definition were established in this 
cas e ; gross income consists of "value", irrespective of 
the form of the Income earned; the time that income is 
recognised is when the taxpayer becomes entitled to the 
Income; and that in determining the value of debts 
outstanding at the year end, some amount has to be 
deducted from their face value.
6.3. THE "DUB AND PAYABLE" INTERPRETATION
The judicial doubts cast on the Lategan Principle may 
be found primarily in the cases of CIR v Delfos (6 SATC 
92) and Hersov's Estate v CIR (21 SATC 106). The 
judgements in these cases, both heard in the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, expressed some support 
for the view that Income accrues when it becomes due 
and payable.
The Delfos case involved the accrual of salary and 
directors' fees to the respondent (Delfos). For a
but only a portion of the renumeration was paid to him 
by his employer. The employer was experiencing 
financial difficulties and it was not clear whether 
Delfos would ever receive the unpaid balance. However, 
during the seventh year the respondent was paid the 
total accumulated arrear remuneration.
The court was faced with two questions of law to be 
answered. The first was: "Did amounts which were
credited to (Delfos) in the books of the company in the 
previous years, but which were not paid to him in those 
years, accrue to or in favour of (him) in those 
years?"; and the second question is not entirely 
relevant to the matter under examination, and has 
therefore been ignored in this paper.
Both the Special Court and the Transvaal Provincial 
Division answered the first question in the 
affirmative. The Appellate Division supported this 
finding unanimously, however, the reasons for agreement 
differed. The presiding judges were Wessels CJ , 
Curlewis, Stratford, Beyers and de Villi'ers JJA.
In his judgement, the learned Chief Justice said (at 6 
SATC 99/100): "I agree with what is said.... in
Lategan's case....that he words "has accrued to or in 
favour of any person" merely mean the amount to which 
he has become entitled".
The judgement of Curlewis JA reads : " I agree that
this appeal must be allowed, and In the main on the 
ground set out In the judgement of the Chief Justice. 
As regards the first question of lav submitted for 
decision by the Special Court, as we are unanimous that 
this must be answered in the affirmative, there is no 
occasion for me to add anything to what my brethren 
have said on the subject."
De Villiers J.A. stated that in his opinion the word 
"accruing" as used in the gross income definition means 
"becoming due and payable". Income therefore accrues 
to a taxpayer at the moment when it becomes due and 
payable, irrespective of whether the debtor is in a 
financial position to pay it.
The interpretation of the word "accrued" by de Villiers 
JA was accepted by Stratford J.A. as being correct. 
Beyers JA said (at 6 SATC 113) "Pat die eerste vraag 
bevestigend beantwoord moet word val nie te betwyfel 
nie", but did not expressly comment on either of the 
alt •rnativs interpretations of the word "accrued".
It is evident that de Villiers and Stratford JJA 
favoured the "due and payable" Interpretation, while 
Vessels CJ agreed with the Lategan principle. It 
would appear that Curlewis JA may have agreed with 
the Chief Justice, but this is not altogether clear. It
seems, also, that Beyers JA did not commit himself one 
way or another. There was therefore no majority 
decision on the matter.
The ease of Hersov's Estate v CIR dealt with an amount 
paid to the estate, in terms of an agreement between 
the deceased and a company of which he was formerly a 
director. Apart from annual remuneration for services 
as a director, the agreement provided for a payment by 
the company to Hersov's Estate on the event of his 
(Hersov's) death. Shortly after the death of Hersov the 
company paid the amount in question to his estate. The 
Commissioner assessed the amount as income during the 
period of assessment ending at the date of the
taxpayers death.
The executor of Hersov's estate claimed that:
1) the amount was of a capital nature;
2) that Hersov did not receive the amount, nor did it
accrue to him;
3) and, alternatively, thai if the amount was of
revenue nature and did accrue to Hersov, it accrued 
on the date of the conclusion of the contract.
The decision in favour of the taxpayer was unanimous. 
Certain portions of the judgement delivered by 
Centlivres C.J. are important:
"In my view there was no accrual of any right to Hersov
to receive the amount: the accrual was in favour of his 
estate and that accrual only took place when the amount
became due and payable I am aware of the fact that
this suggested date of accrual conflicts with the 
decision in Lategan v CIR.
In discussing the Delfos case, the Chief Justice said: 
"Bearing in mind the differences of opinion and in view 
of the fact that there does not seem to be a majority 
view in favour of the decision in Lategan's case I do 
not think that it can be said that Lategan's case was 
accepted by this Court in Delfos's case as correctly 
laying down the law.
"If on the proper interpretation of the word "accrued" 
in the definition of "igross income" in section 1 of &ct 
31 of 1941 that word means "became due and payable" 
then it is clear that there was no accrual of the 
amount paid under clause 2 (c) of the 1938 agreement 
until some time after Hersov's death.It Is. however. 
not necessary to arrive at the definite conclusion tha% 
this is so. because in my opinion it is clear that 
there was no accrual in favour of Hers'ov during his 
lifetime. I may also point out that in Lategan's case 
the accrual that was there held to have taksn place was 
not subject to any condition. In the present case the 
accrual was subject to the condition that Hersov's 
death took place before the winding up of the company" 
(underlining added).
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It is evident from an examination of the judgments of 
both the Delfos and Hersov's Estate cases that the 
"entitled to" interpretation of the word "accrued" was 
challenged. However, neither of these cases went so far 
as to create new legal precedent on the matter, and 
thus the Lategan principle remains intact. Kriegler J, 
in an unreported judgment of the Transvaal Income Tax 
Special Court stated that the Lategan Principle: H has
been doubted judicially and criticized in learned 
publications but essentially it stands bloodied but 
unbowed" (Vorster, 1967).
6.4. THE MEASUREMENT OB GROSS INCOME
As stated in chapter 3.2., there are two major problems 
associated with the recognition of Income, a timing 
problem, (when the income is recognised) and a 
measurement problem (how much income should be taken 
into account). The Delfos and Hersov's Estate cases 
dealt primarily with the former problem, while the 
Latsgan case addressed both problems. The court in the 
Lategan t^se required the Inclusion of the debt still 
unpaid at the year end in gross income at its face 
value less some deduction to bring the debt to its 
present worth at that date. Thus, cognisance was taken 
of the obvious commercial reality of the time value of 
money.
It Is evident that the "due and payable" interpretation 
dees not necessitate that account be taken of the time 
value of money, as the recognition of the income takes 
place at the time the amount is payable. There is hence 
no time difference to affect the value of the accrual, 
and the unpaid debts included in income (i.e. those 
that have already become due and payable) should be 
included at their face value.
However, the gross income definition includes not only 
receipts or accruals denominated in cash, but also 
other types of property. In CIR v Butcher Bros (Pty) 
Ltd (13 SATC 21) the court r • icluded that the words 
"cash or otherwise" in the gross income definition 
include anything which has an ascertainable value in 
money or money's worth. The property to be included in 
gross income may take any form, corporeal or 
incorporeal, as long as it has a money value.
It is interesting to consider the words used in the 
gross income definition. Account has to be taken of 
amounts "received b or accrued to" a taxpayer whether 
"in cash or otherwise". Hes the disjunctive in these 
two phrases been used in a similar manner in order link 
the two concepts in any way? In other words, should 
"received" and "cash" be linked, and similarly, should 
"accrued" be linked to an asset other than cash? There 
would seem to be some validity in the idea that an 
accrual is the receipt of something other than cash.
The valuation problem arising from assets other than in 
cash was addressed in Lace Propietary Mines Ltd v CIR 
(9 SATC 349), where it was found that the appropriate 
value is the amount that could be obtained for the 
asset on the open market if it were to be sold under 
some reasonable method of sale.
Silks et al (1962) submit that the date on which the 
valuation of an accrual, other than in the form of cash
should take place is the date of the accrual. Some
support for this submission may be found in Lace
Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR (9 SATC 349) and Mooi v SIR
(34 SATC 1). However, the Lategan case required that 
the value of unpaid debts be determined at the year
Although there are significant differences between the 
rules attaching to the gross income definition and the 
general deduction formula, it is interesting to note 
that in considering the question of the deductibility 
of expenditure denominated in a foreign currency the 
court, in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR (37 SATC 1), found 
as follows:
"It is only at the end of the year of assessment that 
it is possible, and then it is imperative, to determine 
the amount received or accrued on the one hand and the 
expenditure actually incurred on the other during the 
year of assessment; " .
It would appear that Watermeyer J may have changed his 
opinion regarding the date of valuation of debts unpaid 
at the year end since he gave his decision in the 
Lategan case. In Ochberg v CIR (6 SATC 1) it would seem 
that Watermeyer J implied that the valuation should 
take place at the date of the conclusion of the 
transaction when he said (at 6 SATC 7):
"So soon as an unconditional sale has been concluded 
there vests in the seller the right to claim the 
purchase price in defined instalments at defined future 
dates: in other words the right to claim these
instalments accrues to him. If the sale is for cash, 
the full purchase price accrues to him, if the sale is 
on credit, payable in future instalments then an 
allowance must be made therefor because what accrues to 
him is really only the present value of the right to 
claim payment in the future".
A practical solution to the problem of the valuation of 
uncollected debts has been suggested by Vorster (1967)1
" taxpayers are entitled to include in their
gross income only the market value of book debts as at 
the last day of the year of assessment. In establishing 
that market value, taxpayers would be well advised to 
obtain competitive guotations for their book debts from 
banks and other concerns purchasing and collecting book 
debts and, perhaps, to accept an average value based on 
those quotations".
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It is contended that although Mr Vorster's submission 
is convenient in practice, it is possibly not correct 
in law, as the valuation would appear to take place at 
the incorrect date. It would seem as if the valuation 
of the accrual should be made at the time of the
accrual, rather than the end of the year of" assessment. 
This aspect is examined further in chapter 7,3.
AnotN« timing problem that has to be addressee arises 
from the requirement of the gross income definition 
that cognisance should be taken of income “received by 
or accrued to" a taxpayer. Where the receipt of the
income does not take place at the same time as the
accrual, even if both events take place in the same 
year of assessment, the time difference between the two 
datee may, in certain circumstances, give rise to a 
valuation problem (due to the concept of the time value 
of money).
Weasels C.J. came to the conclusion (in CIR v Delfos, 6 
SATC 92, at 102) that the use of the disjunctive, "or", 
enabled the taxation of income to take place either at 
the time of the receipt, or the time of the accrual. It 
would seem, from the judgment in SIR v Silverglen 
Investments (Pty) Ltd (3D SATC 199), that the income 
becomes taxable at the time of the event (either
receipt or accrual) that occurs first. It has been 
submitted by O'Donovan (1969) that the Commissioner for
7-'' and Revenue has no discretion as to whether the tax 
is leviable at the time of receipt or accrual, but is 
bound to recognise the income at the time of occurrence 
of the earlier event.
7. ANOMALIES AND SHORTFALLS
The matters raised in this chapter are intended tc 
highlight problem areas, or potential problem areas. In 
the existing legislation and case law, and the 
Commissioner's prevailing practice, regarding the 
accrual of income. In some cases it has been prisible 
to suggest a solution to a particular problem. In other 
cases, where there is no apparent answer, the problem 
has been left unresolved. It may be t.iat there are no 
solutions to some of the problems, but it is considered 
Important that t:.o problem areas are recognised, so 
that they may be avoided in the event of any changes 
being made to the existing position.
7,1. OTHER SECTIONS OF THE ACT
Section 7 (1)'. "Income shall be deemed to have accrued 
to a person notwithstanding that such Income has been 
invested, accumulated or otherwise capitalized by him 
or that such income has not been actually paid over to
credited in account or reinvested or accumulated or 
capitalized or otherwise dealt with in his name or on 
nis behalf, and a complete statement of all such income 
shall be Included by any person in the returns rendered 
by him under this Act" (underlining added).
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It is evident that if the Lategan Principle provided 
the correct interpretation of "accrued", then section 
7(1} is superfluous. It may be argued that the 
existence of this section lends weight to the "due and 
payable" interpretation.
Meyerowltz and Spiro (1967) submit that section 7(1) 
does not enlarge the meaning of "accrue", as it does 
not deem an accrual to take place in the given 
circumstances, but deems the accrual notwithstanding 
these circumstances.
The use of the words "remains due and payable* in the 
section cannot be considered to lend any support to the 
"due and payable" interpretation. The section 
continues, immediately after these words, to describe 
circumstances where the income would not be due and 
payable, although the taxpayer would still be entitled 
to the reinvested, accumulated or capitalized income.
It appears as if the reason for the existence of 
section 7 (1) is to clarify or confirm the treatment of 
the income, rather than to expand upon the gross income 
definition. The income Tax Special Court has found, in 
ITC 563 (13 SATC 319), that the equivalent section in 
the 1941 Act was of no assistance in determining the 
meaning of the term "accrued" because of the obscurity 
of the section.
Section 24(1) : "If any taxpayer has entered into any
agreement with any other person in respect of any 
property the effect of which is that, in the case of 
movable property, the ownership shall pass or, in the 
case of immovable property, transfer shall be passed 
from the taxpayer to that other person, upon or after 
the receipt by the taxpayer of the whole or a certain 
portion of the amount payable to the taxpayer under the 
agreement, the whole of that amount shall for the 
purposes of this Act be deemed to have accrued to the 
taxpayer on the day on which the agreement was entered
Again, it may be argued that this section is 
superfluous if the Lategan Principle is correct. 
However, there is an important difference between the 
accrual of income under section 24(1) and the 
equivalent accrual in terms of the Lategan Principle. 
Although the timing of the accrual would be the same 
under both methods, the quantum of the accrual would 
differ. The Lategan Principle requires that the present 
value of the payments be taken into account, while 
section 24 (1) requires "the whc 1 • •-? that amount" be
included in income. The reason tu:- this difference is 
clear. Section 24 provides for a special allowance to 
be granted to take account of the uncollected amount's 
at the end „f each year of assessment. The existence of 
this allowance negates (partly) the need for a present 
value determination of the accrual.
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The manner in which section 24(1) operates Is also 
necessary for another reason. The suspensive condition 
involved in the transactions dealt with by section 24 
may prevent the accrual from being recognised under the 
normal rules of accrual (due to the principle in Mooi v 
SIR, 34 SATC 1). However, the workings of section 22, 
dealing with trading stock, would be such that the 
stock sold would not be accounted foe after the sale. 
Thus section 24 plays an important role in matching the 
income with the expenditure in the case of suspensive 
sale transactions.
It would seem that the existence of section 24(1) does 
not support either the "due and payable" interpretation 
or the Lategan Principle.
Sections 11 (i) and (j) provide for deductions for bad 
and doubtful debts "due to the taxpayer". It is 
submitted that the use of the words "due to" can offer 
no assistance in determining the meaning at "accrued". 
It would seem as if debts cannot be considered to be 
bad until such time as they are due and payable, thus 
giving good reason for the choice of wording used in 
the sections in question. Also, the calculation of a 
deduction under the artificial system of income 
determination is so far divorced from the recognition 
of income that there may be no relevance in attempting 
to achieve a comparison between the two aspects.
7.2. DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE
The Commissioner for Inland Revenue has adopted the
Lategan Principle as being the correct interpretation 
of the term "accrued" as used in the gross income 
definition, as far as the timing of income recognition 
is concerned. The departmental practice revolves around 
the perception that the Lategan Principle consists of
two parts, the one being the timing aspect, and the
ether the valuation aspect. The practice is based upon 
the "entitled to" interpretation of "accrued", but the 
income is brought to account at the face value of the 
accrual, irrespective of when the amount is payable.
The Income Tax Special Court has found that this
departmental practice is incorrect in law, and that the 
Commissioner must take account of the "present worth" 
of the future instalments (Vorster, 1987). Although 
there may be two parts to the Lategan principle, they 
are inextricably linked and cannot be applied 
separately.
7.3. THE VALUATION OF ACCRUALS
There are enormous, unresolved problems attached to any 
form of valuation. A valuation is an individual's 
perception of worth at a particular time. The value of 
an item may differ from one moment in time to the next.
and the perception of the value may change from valuer 
to valuer . It is important to recognise that a 
valuation is essentially onli an opinion. No solution 
to the valuation problems that have plagued accountants 
and economists for,centuries is proposed, but an 
analysis of the problem may assist in providing some 
clarification of the situation.
It is essential, first of all, to determine the nature
of the asset to be valued. The gross income definition
refers to "the total amount, in cash or otherwise". It 
is evident that there are two classes of assets that 
have to be included in gross income, viz,, cash, and 
amounts other than in cash.
Cash is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as : 
"Ready money, actual coins, notes, etc."
It would, however, seem as If the term "cash" has taken
on a wider meaning than that attributable to the common
usage of the word. Accountants sometimes include bank 
deposits in their definition of cash. Economists may 
stretch the definition so as to include certain money 
market instruments (sometimes also referred to as near­
money ).
Samuelson (1964) describes cash as follows!
"Cash consists of coins, currency, and money on deposit
in the bank. Cash is the only asset whose value is 
exact rather than an estimate. All other valuations 
involve some guesswork, albeit careful guesswork."
Joubert (1976) equates the term "cash" with the term 
"legal tender". "Legal tender" is defined in the S.A. 
Mint and Coinage Act (Act 79 of 1964) as being coins 
and banknotes In South African currency (certain limits 
are placed on the value of bronze and silver coins, but 
not on gold coins).
It would seem appropriate to accept the narrow 
definition of the term "cash", and to limit ivs meaning 
to be' equivalent to "legal tender". It would seem that 
even if a wider meaning is attributed to the word, the 
argument that follows will still be valid.
Murray J found, in the case of Bold v Cooper and 
another, that: "The mere delivery of a cheque, In a
cash transaction, is indisputably not payment of
It would appear, also, as if there is a distinct 
difference in our law between cash and credit sales, 
(see Sadie v Standard Bank and Laing v South African 
Milling Co. Ltd.).
The difference between cash and an asset other than ir 
cash was well recognis-l in the Lategan case. 
Hatermeyer J explained:
"So far as a debt was concerned which was payable in 
the future and not in the year of assessment, it might 
be difficult to hold that the cash amount of the debt 
had accrued to the taxpayer in the year of assessment. 
He had not become entitled to a right to claim payment 
of the debt in the year of assessment but he had 
acquired a right to claim payment of the debt in the 
future. This right had vested in him, had accrued to 
him in the year of assessment and it was a valuable 
right which he could turn into money if he wished to do
Although Weasels CJ also took cognisance of the 
difference between cash and a right to claim payment in 
the Delfos case, it would appear as if the dissenting 
judgments (delivered by Stratford and de Villlers JJA) 
ignored this. It does not seem possible that a right to 
claim payment in the future may become due and payable 
until such time as the right matures. This would appear 
to indicate that a right to claim payment in the future 
should not be considered to be an asset.
The general rule to be followed in the valuation of an 
asset other than cash received or accrued waa 
established in Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR (9 SATC
<«
349) as being the amount that could be obtained for it 
on the open market. This valuation should take place at 
the time of the accrual (contcaey to the proposal in 
the Lategan case).
A large number of problems may arise:
What if there is no ready market for the asset in 
question?
What if the asset has value to the recipient, but does 
not have a value to anyone else, because of its special 
characteristics?
What if the asset can only be realised at some date in 
the future?
Probably the most significant problem that arises 
relates to a taxpayer who sells goods on credit* 
Presumably, each accrual has to be valued at the time 
of the sale. The interest rates prevailing at the time 
of the transaction and the various elements of risk 
Involved will have to be taken into account in 
determining the present value of the debt, and further, 
a set of records reflecting these values will have to 
be kept.
It would seem that if the credit sales were not valued 
(i.e. some amount deducted from their face values to 
take account of the time delay between and
payment), an inequitable situation wou±. where
certain assets other than in cash are valued on one 
basis, while other assets are valued on a different 
basis. This is the situation at present, arising from 
the policy followed by the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue.
It is surprising that there has not boon a significant 
move towards the use of promissory notes, bills of 
exchange and other similar negotiable instruments, 
rather than credit sales. There may be significant tax 
benefits attached to the use of negotiable Instruments 
under the present method of valuing accruals of assets 
other than in cash.
7.4. OTHER PROBLEM AREAS
Consider the position of two taxpayers, A and B, who 
both enter into an identical transaction. Trading stock 
is sold to C for an amount of R150, payable at a future 
date. The future date in question falls outside the 
current year of assessment. At th.^ ;•-e of the sale, 
the present value of the debt is R100. A waits until 
the debt becomes due and payable, anu collects the 
R150. B, however, factors the debt with the/ bank on the 
same day as the sale, and receives R100 for the d:bt. B 
then invests this R100 in a fixed deposit. During the 
period between the sale and the settlement date B earns 
interest of R40 on the fixed deposit. This interest of
R40 accrues to B subsequent to the first year end (B 
only becomes entitled to it at the time that it becomes 
due and payable, in order to avoid compounding the 
problem arising from the differences in these
concepts).
The transactions described shall be used to 
demonstrate a number of problems that exist, as Car as 
the accrual of the income is concerned. For the 
purposes of this study the difference between the 
present value and the face value of an accrual will be 
called the "discount".
If the Lategan Principle is followed, it is evident 
that the rand value of the accrual will differ from the 
ultimate receipt by the amount of the discount. How 
should this discount be treated? Is the discount part 
of the original accrual, and to ba ignored? Or should 
it be taxed as a receipt at the time that the debt is
Case 1. If the discount is ignored, the following 
position arises:
A i Gross 
B : Gross
income
income
Case 2• If the discount is taxed as a receipt:
Yaar_l Yaar-2
If the "due and payable" Interpretation is' followed a 
problem arises in the treatment of B ’s transactions. It 
is clear that at the time of the sale B has not accrued 
anything as no amount is due and payable. When B 
factors the debt, it would seem appropriate to include 
the amount received £R100) in gross income (as it is an 
amount received, not of a capital nature).
Case 3. If the "due and payable" Interpretation is 
followedt
Year 1 Year J2
A s Gross Income i sale - R 160
B : Gross income 8 sale R 100
s interest - R 40
It has been assumed in each case, that at the date of 
settlement of the debt, B has not been entitled to 
claim payment. The amount became duo and payable to, 
and was received by the factor.
The results may be summarised as follows :
lY.g.flj— 1 Y e a r  2 Isial
R 100
Tha most striking feature of these results is that in 
all three eases the result Is the same for B, while
they differ for A.
In considering the manner in which the Lategan 
principle was applied in case 2, where the discount was 
taxed on receipt, the intuitive reaction is to consider 
the taxation of the value (R100) at the time of the 
accrual, and the taxation of the discount (RSO), at the 
time of receipt, to be "double taxation" of the 
discount. This argument could be supported by the fact 
that the amount of the receipt (the full R150,
including the R50 discount) was taken into account in 
determining the accrual value of R100.
The case for subjecting the discount to tax can 
apparently be well supported by logically based 
argument. This argument is based on the fundamental 
assumption underlying the application of the present
value concept. In the valuation exercise the 
reinvestment of all income at ths same rate of leturn 
is assumed. The discount earned can thus be compared to 
the income that would be earned on reinvestment, and 
should therefore be taxed seperately.
If a comparison is made between A and a money market 
dealer an interesting observation may result. If the 
dealer buys a negotiable instrument at a discount and
holds it to maturity, and profits by the amount of the 
difference between the maturity val-Jt and the cost, the 
net result is that the profit would consitute taxable 
income. When A holds an asset that increases in value 
with the effluxion of time (like the negotiable 
instrument held by the dealer), why should that 
increase in value not be subjected to tax? If A sold 
the debt immediately, at the time of the transact.ton, 
and reinvested it by means of purchasing another asset 
that pays the same amount at the same future date, it 
Is clear the & would be treated In the same manner as 
the dealer, and would be taxed on the discount {profit > 
of R50. Should the act of interposing a third party in 
the transaction result in a different position for tax 
purposes? The fact of the matter is that both A and the 
dealer would sarn income, and that income will actually 
be paid in the future (i.e. it is not notional in 
either case ) .
It is well recognised by economists that the 
reinvestment assumption in the valuation process is 
subject to numerous problems. These problems would be 
compounded if the Income in question constitutes a 
stream of payments (such as a typical suspensive sale 
arrangement), as opposed to the single payment 
considered above . The problem regarding the treatment 
of the discount arises, it is submitted, from the
rather than in the tax treatment. The discount is, in 
fact, part of a single transaction and cannot be 
treated separately, despite the very convincing 
arguments to the contrary.
It is interesting to note that in cases 1 and 3, A 
would be in exactly the same financial position since 
the present value (i.e. the "real" value) o'" the 
resulting tax payments would be exactly the same. Can 
it be said, then, that although the accruals are 
treated differently, that there is no effective 
difference between the Lategan Principle and the "due 
and payable" interpretation?
7.5. THE COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY
The Commission of Enquiry into Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy in South Africa, referred to as the Franzsen 
Commission, (paragraph 32, Second Report, RP 86/1970) 
examined the question of the meaning of "accrued". The 
Pranzsen Commission concluded that the Lategan 
Principle represents the current law and that no 
amendment to the Act was necessary.
The Commission of Enquiry into the Tax Structure of the 
Republic of South Africa, also referred to as the Margo 
Commission, (paragraphs 9.7 to 9.10, RP 34/1987)
discussed this controversy briefly. This Commission 
clearly favoured the Lategan Principle over the "due 
and payable" interpretation.
The Margo Commission discussed the timing of income 
recognition as follows!
" While it may be justifiable to defer the gross
profit, portion of a debt payable in the Suture, as 
occurs in the case of a deferral in terms of s 24, the 
Commission cannot see any justification for deferring 
the entire amount of the debt until cash is received. 
After all. Inventories are recognised, and they are 
even further removed from cash. The test of entitlement 
is clearly appropriate as it determines when an asset 
exists in the business. In applying the entitlement 
test, artificial devices which are adopted in an 
endeavour to defer entitlement must be disregarded. 
Where a taxpayer has become entitled to a right in 
terms of which an amount is payable in a future year of 
assessment, due allowance should be made in the 
valuation thereof for the futurity of that right beyond 
twelve months."
The Commission's recommendations are:
"Income should be recognised when all events Have 
occurred which fix the right to receive it 2nd the 
amount thereof can be determined with r aasonable 
accuracy; but due allowance should be m.u’ :or the 
futurity of the right beyond twelve month:."
Furthermore, the Commission recommended that there 
should be some consistency between the test for 
recognising an accrual of income, and the test for
recognising the incurral of expenditure.
A number of observations regarding the Commission's 
findings are of interest. The Commission could not see 
anv Justification for deferring accruals until the cash 
is received. Possibly the Commission had not come 
across the "wherewithal to pay" concept described in 
chapter 4.1. It is submitted that the reason given for 
not favouring a deferral ("After all, inventories are 
recognised, and they are even further removed from 
cash"), is not well founded. The operation of sec*
22, in including closing stock in the determlnatic. 
taxable income, does not amount to the recognition u. 
any "income", but is rather the negativing of an 
"expense". In other words, rather than creating income, 
section 22 effectively falls to recognise an expense, 
thus resulting in a mechanism for the deferral of the
recognition of expenditure until such time as the
associated income is brought to account. If closing 
stock was valued at market value, including unrealised 
profits, then the Commission’s reasoning might have had 
sc-me foundation.
The Commis. 
"payable li
,'s comment regarding an 
. future year of assessment".
mtitlement 
and where
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some account should be taken In the valuation of the 
entitlement "for the futurity of that right beyond 
twelve months", also deserves to be questioned. If the 
debt is payable in the same tax year that the 
entitlement arises, but is due after twelve months (in 
the case of a year of assessment that is longer than a 
calender year), should some allowance be mrde for the 
futurity of the right? Why was the cut-off period of 
twelve months chosen, rather than, say, nine months, or 
fifteen months? Possibly a period ending six months 
after the year end of the taxpayer would be more 
appropriate, in order to coincide with the timing of 
the third provisional payment.
It is 'submitted that the Commission’s recommendation 
that the Act be amended to ensure that all events which 
fix the right to receive the Income must have occurred, 
and that the amount of the income must be capable of 
being determined with reasonable accuracy, may have 
significant impact on the position as it stands at 
present. The impact would result if this amendment is 
linked to the recommendation regarding the incurral of 
expenditure.
It may be argued, however, that the recommended 
amendment in respect of the recognition of income 
would, on its own, be superfluous, as the principles in 
question probably already exist in our law (from, inter
alia, cases such as CXR v Butcher Bros (Bty i Ltd, 12 
SATC 21 and Moei v SIR, 34 SATC 1), The present 
position requires that there be no suspensive condition 
in existence, and that the Income must be quantifiable 
before it can be included in gross income.
The importance of the Commission's recommendation- lies 
in the linking of the concepts of accrual of income and 
the incurral of expenditure. The Commission only goes 
so far as to suggest that the t ming of the accrual of 
Income and the incurral of expenditure should be 
linked. However, a far greater problem may exist in the 
inconsistency of the measurement of the quantum, of the 
two items. On one hand a peasant value exercise is 
carried out to determine the value of accruals, while 
on the other no account is taken of the value of 
expenditure, even though it may be payable in the
8. RESEARCH RESULTS 
0.1. THE CURRENT LAW
The conflict of ideas regarding the meaning of "accrued 
to", as usad in the gross income definition, has 
attracted considerable attention over the years. The 
interpretation that is followed by the courts, at this 
stage, was Initially laid down in the Lategan case. 
Kriegler J has pointed out that although the Lategan 
principle has been criticised and doubted, it still 
constitutes the current law.
In comparing the Lategan principle to the "due and 
payable" interpretation, no assistance can be found in 
the Act as to which interpretation should be followed. 
It is submitted, based upon the discussion’ in the body 
of this report, that the current law regarding «the 
accrual of income is as follows:
Income accrues to a taxpayer when' he becomes 
unconditionally entitled to the amount in question. 
Where the accrual consists of an amount other than in 
cash (including the right to claim the payment of cash 
at a future date), the value of the asset must be 
determined at the time of the accrual.
In applying this interpretation, it is suggested that 
the following guidelines could be useful in overcoming 
some of the practical difficulties:
When the income consists of an asset other than cash, 
the open market value, or an estimate theredf should be 
used to determine the quantum of the accrual. When the 
asset accrued is a right to claim future payment, the 
debt should be valued by deducting an amount from the 
face value of the debt. The amount deducted from the 
face value, the discount, should be determined by 
applying the appropriate interest rate to the face 
value of the debt for the appropriate period.
The interest rate that is apvrop-ni.d is the risk-free 
rate, applicable to the period in question, that is 
prevailing in the financial market place at the time of 
the accrual. (The* rate attached to gilt edged 
securities of an equivalent.period would seem ideal.) 
The risk-free rate hac been suggested as the risk of 
default should be accounted for by way of the section 
11 (i) and (J) allowances.
The period that should be used in the discounting 
exercise should start on the date of the entitlement, 
and should end on the date that the amount becomes due 
and payable.
8.2. EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LAW
In order to eatabi uhethuc the current law, as 
Interpreted in chapter 9.1., possesses the 
theoretically' desirable characteristics described in 
chapter 4, an evaluation of the law is necessary.
The "wherewithal to pay" principle is not well 
recognised in the current state of the law. Some relief 
exists in other sections of the Act (for example 
sections 24 and 24A) to alleviate the hardship this 
creates in certain circumstances. The strict adherence 
to this principle entails the risk of enabling the easy 
avoidance of the recognition of income by the use of 
barter-type transactions. It would seem that the 
principle may be followed without attracting the 
associated problem by ignoring the principle in 
recognising the income, but making allowance for the
wherewithal to pay at another stage in the
determination of taxable income, as is the case in the
current law.. It is submitted that the current law does 
not prnvids adequately for the wherewithal to pay 
principle, and that greater recognition should be given 
to this matter.
The realisation concept would appear to be suitably
taken into account in the current law (with the 
exception of the matters detailed above, regarding the
wherewithal to pay principle). The problem that exists 
in our law, however, is that the realisation concept is 
not spelled out clearly in the legislation, but results 
mainly from case law and current business and 
accounting practice. In other countries, most notably 
the United States, extensive use is made of detailed 
sets of rules and the publ .cation of the practice 
followed by the revenue authorities. It may be 
appropriate to formulate a set of rules to be followed 
if the realisation concept is to be amended in any way. 
As is the case with the wherewithal to pay principle it 
would seem as if the realisation concept should be 
recognised in the calculation of taxable income at some 
stage after the determination of gross income.
The concepts of equity and uniformity are adequately 
represented in the interpretation detailed in chapter 
B.l. These principles are neglected in the commonly 
held interpretation whereby unpaid debts accrued during 
the tax year are valued at the year end as there is a 
divergence between the valuations of different types of 
accruals that consist of non-cash assets.
Base and consistency of administration, it is 
submitted, cannot be achieved under the current law. 
The fact that valuations are virtually always based on 
subjective criteria must surely result in Inconsistency 
in the valuation of non-cash accruals. Furthermore, the
use of credit sales and negotiable instruments, the 
number of non-cash accruals that require valuation 
would, in many (if not most) businesses, necessitate an 
administrative burden of Immense proportions. Although 
no empirical evidence has been sought to substantiate 
this contention, it is submitted that the current law 
(as interpreted in chapter 8.1.) cannot operate in a 
modern economy where the vast majority of transactions 
are not cash transactions. It would seem as if this 
matter requires the attention of the legislature.
The social and economic objectives that are considered 
desirable may be dealt with adequately in the 
determination of taxable Income without interfering 
with the accrual of gross income. The manner in which 
these objectives are achieved in the present law, with 
certain types of income being exempt, appears to be the 
best method of achieving the desired result. (Whether 
the result la desirable is a question that warrants 
investigation.)
0.3. OTHER FINDINGS
The controversy that has arisen over the intecgcetatton 
of "accrued to" may be of limited relevance as there 
may be no effective difference between the two 
concepts. If the Lategan principle is applied correctly 
(contrary to current Departmental practice) the income 
in question should be quantified in such a manner that 
it has the same economic value as the quantum of income 
that would be brought to account under the "due and 
payable" interpretation. Although there may be a 
difference in the timing of the income recognition, 
there would be no economic vtfference.
There are many, varied factors to take into
cons.deration when devising a method of recognising 
income for tax purposes. The complexities of the issues 
involved require that any changes to the existing law 
or the development of an entirely new income 
recognition method should he very carefully researched
and tested before any attempt is made to put them into
place. The recommendations formulated by the Margo
Commission appear, on the surface, to be entirely 
reasonable and appropriate. However, on closer scrutiny 
it is evident that these recommendations are far from 
being suitable.
Other methods of recognising income that have been 
examined in this report, specifically the methods used 
in other tax jurisdictions and by accountants, have 
proven to be workable over a number of years. There is 
no doubt that on closer examination these other methods 
may be shown to have flaws. However, the relevant point 
is that they are workable, whereas the current law, as 
interpreted in chapter 8.1, it is submitted, is not 
capable of being applied in practice.
It appears as if the main problem faced in the 
application of the current law is the manner in which 
accruals are valued. The valuation exercise has certain 
inherent problems and may be incompatible with the 
purpose for which it is being used. Accountants have 
faced a similar problem in attempting to combine 
economic valuations with historic cost accounting In 
what is called Current Cost Accounting (CCA). At one 
time there was considerable support for CCA among the 
accounting fraternity, but this has waned somewhat over 
the past decade. It was found that the incompatibility 
of the concepts involved in CCA provided results that 
were of limited use.
The valuation of accruals, specifically in respect of 
debts, leads to the problem of how the discount (the 
difference between the face value a m ; the present valus 
of the debt) should be treated. It is not at all clear
ewhat route should be followed In this regard, as the 
alternative courses of action may each be justified by 
logical argument. It Is important to note that none of 
the foreign jurisdictions examined use valuations in 
determining the quantum of the accrual of debts. The 
face value of the debt is taken into account at the 
date of entitlement.
9. CONCLUSIONS
It Is predicted that the South African revenue 
authorities will be forced to abandon their long­
standing policy regarding the accrual of income
(whereby the valuation aspect of the Lategan Principle 
is ignored) in the near future. Although this policy is 
far from being perfect, it has one redeeming feature in 
that it works. The revenue authorities have been able 
to achieve a good level of ease and consistency in 
administration, especially in dealing with credit
transactions, through the use of this policy. At long 
last a taxpayer has taken Revenue to task on this 
matter (see Vorster, 1987) and it appears as if the 
time has come for amendments to the legislation, as 
Revenue will probably be unable to administer 
effectively the existing law without the use of their 
present Departmental Practice.
If and when the gross income definition is amended, it 
is recommended that the four concepts' described in 
chapters 4.1. to 4.4. should be kept firmly in view. 
The artificial nature of determining income adopted by 
the Act enables the relatively easy implementation of 
these concepts. It is suggested that the recognition of 
"gross income " can be kept fairly simple, while the 
adoption of the important concepts can be incorporated
at a later stage in the determination of taxable 
income. Changes to the method of recognising income 
will necessitate a process of re-education of the 
people involved in the practice and administration of 
tax matters and it is submitted that at this stage it 
may be appropriate to maintain the same basic format as 
exists at present. Furthermore, the artificial nature 
of the income determination process provides the 
opportunity to create a mechanism whereby any valuation 
exercise that may be required can be removed from the 
recognition stage in order enable some control over the 
valuation exercise.
In the formulation of any potential solution to the 
problems examined in this paper it is suggested that 
there is much to be learned from the experience of 
others. From a practical point of view, the Revenue has 
always relied upon the accountants to provide the basis 
for the preparation of returns of income. Although 
there are significant differences between accounting 
and taxable income, reliance has always been placed on 
accounts drawn up from historic costs and undiscounted 
receivables and payables. Should the Commissioner wish 
to discard the traditional method of keeping accounts 
and move towards a present value recognition of 
transactions, he would have to keep his own score or 
formulate a method of converting historic cost 
financial statements appropriately.
The gross income definition is the cornerstone of the 
Act, and its importance cannot be underestimated. The 
time for amendments to either the Act or the 
Departmental Practice is almost upon us. In order to 
avoid hasty and inappropriate action being taken by the 
revenue authorities, the necessary research should be 
undertaken as soon as possible so as to formulate 
suitable solutions to the problems that have been 
identified in this research report.
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